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Note 
 
Gagging on the First Amendment: Assessing 
Challenges to the Reauthorization Act’s 
Nondisclosure Provision 
Kyle Hawkins∗ 
“Safety from external danger is the most powerful director  
of national conduct.” 
Alexander Hamilton1 
 
In 2004, the president of a small Internet access and con-
sulting business received a national security letter (NSL) from 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).2 The letter ordered 
the president to divulge private information about one of the 
company’s clients.3 A judge had not reviewed or approved the 
letter.4 Accompanying the letter was a gag order: the president 
was forbidden to disclose to anyone, including the client, that 
the FBI was seeking the requested information.5 The presi-
dent’s story is known only because of his anonymous editorial 
in The Washington Post.6 To this day, the identity of the presi-
 
∗  J.D. Candidate 2009, University of Minnesota Law School; A.B. 2002, 
Harvard College. Special thanks to Professors Michael Stokes Paulsen and 
Heidi Kitrosser for invaluable advice and commentary. Thanks also to Eliza-
beth Borer, David Jensen, Jeff Justman, and Michael Schoepf for their helpful 
feedback on earlier drafts. Finally, thanks to Doug and Greer Hawkins and 
June Bands for constant support and encouragement. Copyright © 2008 by 
Kyle Hawkins. 
 1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 8, at 35 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961). 
 2. Editorial, My National Security Letter Gag Order, WASH. POST, Mar. 
23, 2007, at A17. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. On March 23, 2007, the company president submitted an editorial 
to The Washington Post describing his or her experiences. The newspaper’s 
editorial board noted in a disclaimer that while it does not publish anonymous 
pieces as a matter of policy, it made an exception in this case “because the au-
thor—who would have preferred to be named—is legally prohibited from dis-
 2008] CHALLENGES TO NONDISCLOSURE 275 
 
dent, including his (or her) gender and company, is not publicly 
known. 
Rather than submitting the requested information to the 
FBI, the president enlisted the assistance of the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) and filed a lawsuit—Doe v. Ashcroft, 
known now as Doe I—challenging the constitutionality of the 
NSL power.7 This lawsuit presented the district court with a 
difficult question of balancing. The case pitted an individual’s 
First Amendment rights against the government’s need for 
secrecy in its terrorism investigations.8 To the district court, 
this was a simple case of prior restraint, legally indistinguisha-
ble from a local government film board prohibiting a movie’s 
general release prior to its screening for indecency.9 Prior re-
straints on speech require strict scrutiny review, the court rea-
soned.10 The fact that the subject matter involved national se-
curity during the post-9/11 war on terror did not persuade the 
court to grant the FBI additional leeway.11 Appling a strict 
scrutiny standard of review, the court found the relevant NSL 
nondisclosure provisions unconstitutional.12 The president’s 
First Amendment challenge succeeded over the government’s 
objection that the statute imposed no prior restraint and me-
rited only intermediate scrutiny.13 
The story did not end there. Doe I was only the first skir-
mish in a protracted back-and-forth between Congress, Inter-
net providers and the federal courts; Doe v. Gonzales (Doe III) 
 
closing his or her identity.” Id. 
 7. See Doe v. Ashcroft (Doe I), 334 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), va-
cated, 449 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 8. See id. at 474 (“The high stakes here . . . compel the Court to strike 
the most sensitive judicial balance, calibrating by delicate increments toward 
a result that adequately protects national security without unduly sacrificing 
individual freedoms, that endeavors to do what is just for one and right for 
all.”). 
 9. See Doe v. Gonzales (Doe III), 500 F. Supp. 2d 379, 399–400 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007) (comparing the NSL nondisclosure order to the facts of Freedman v. 
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965), which involved film restrictions imposed by the 
Maryland State Board of Censors). 
 10. See id. at 401 (concluding that strict scrutiny should apply even 
though the case involves national security). 
 11. See id.  
 12. See id. at 425. 
 13. See Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment and in Support of the Government's Cross-Motion to Dismiss 
the Complaint Or For Summary Judgment, at 50–54, Doe I, 334 F. Supp. 2d 
471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (No. 04 Civ. 2614), vacated, 449 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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is merely the latest episode.14 That tug-of-war continues today 
as Congress is considering amendments to the NSL nondisclo-
sure provision in response to Doe III.15 Through the maze of re-
pealed provisions and court decisions, however, there remains 
the fundamental question of whether the Doe III court was cor-
rect to apply strict scrutiny. This question remains alive today 
as the latest iteration of the NSL nondisclosure provision, in-
troduced in the Senate in September 2007, does not prescribe a 
specific standard to courts reviewing a nondisclosure chal-
lenge.16 The question is open-ended, and, on future challenges, 
judges in other jurisdictions must decide whether to follow the 
Doe III rule or to adopt a different test. 
This Note offers a critique of the Doe decisions, which all 
apply strict scrutiny, and suggests that intermediate scrutiny 
is the proper standard of review for NSL nondisclosure chal-
lenges. Based on a line of cases that grew from the Espionage 
Act of 1917,17 federal courts have previously indicated that 
matters of national security deserve different legal treatment 
than run-of-the-mill free speech cases.18 This Note suggests 
that such reasoning should apply to NSL nondisclosure chal-
lenges, and reviewing courts should use a lower standard. In 
that regard, this Note presents a new approach to an outcome 
that the government unsuccessfully sought in Doe I.19 The gov-
ernment’s brief argued for intermediate scrutiny based on a 
line of grand jury secrecy cases.20 Since that reasoning failed in 
the Doe cases and the courts applied strict scrutiny, the gov-
ernment needs a new argument to justify intermediate scruti-
 
 14. See Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 387–89 (discussing the procedural his-
tory of the case including Doe I, Doe v. Gonzales (Doe II), 386 F. Supp. 2d 66 
(D. Conn. 2005), and congressional responses). 
 15. See NSL Reform Act of 2007, S. 2088, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 16. Id. 
 17. See 18 U.S.C. § 793 (2000). 
 18. See, e.g., United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1070 (4th Cir. 1988) 
(holding that First Amendment rights are not implicated in Espionage Act 
cases); United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 637 (E.D. Va. 2006) (deny-
ing First Amendment protection for a government employee who leaked classi-
fied information). 
 19. See Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment and in Support of the Government's Cross-Motion to Dismiss 
the Complaint Or For Summary Judgment, at 50–54, Doe I, 334 F. Supp. 2d 
471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (No. 04 Civ. 2614), vacated, 449 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(arguing in support of intermediate scrutiny based on the Butterworth v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 624 (1990) line of cases but not invoking Espionage Act juri-
sprudence). 
 20. See infra notes 122–45, 147–56. 
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ny. This Note devises that that new argument should be based 
on national-security jurisprudence. In order to understand the 
role NSLs play in promoting national security, Part I discusses 
the origins of NSLs, as well as their current statutory construc-
tion and ongoing uses. Part II then discusses relevant First 
Amendment and national security doctrine as it affects nondis-
closure orders. Finally, Part III analyzes the government’s in-
terest in secrecy and explains why courts should apply inter-
mediate scrutiny for challenges to NSL statutes. 
I. THE HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND OF THE 
NSL PROCEDURE AS AN ANTITERRORISM TACTIC  
Under the current statutory scheme, NSLs “require Ameri-
cans to cough up loads of information on colleagues and 
clients—maybe you—and to never breathe a word to anyone of 
what they’ve done.”21 Although this Note focuses primarily on 
the statute at issue in Doe III,22 four statutes authorize the FBI 
to issue NSLs.23 The earliest of these dates to 1986.24 However, 
the events of September 11, 2001 and the enactment of the 
USA Patriot Act in late 200125 brought national attention26 to 
NSLs due to the important role that they play in gathering ter-
 
 21. Ronald J. Sievert, Patriot 2005-2007: Truth, Controversy, and Conse-
quences, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 319, 330 (2007) (quoting On Point: National 
Security Letters: Use or Misuse? (National Public Radio broadcast Nov. 10, 
2005), available at http://archives.onpointradio.org/shows/2005/11/20051110_ 
a_main.asp). 
 22. See USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, 
Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (codified in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3511 (West 
2006)), invalidated by Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y 2007). 
 23. See, e.g., Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA), 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3401–
3422 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008); Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1681 (2000); Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 2709 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008), invalidated by Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007); National Security Act, 50 U.S.C. § 436 (West 2003 & Supp. 
2008). 
 24. See 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3401–22. 
 25. See USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56 115 Stat. 272 (co-
dified in scattered sections of U.S.C.). For a general discussion of the evolution 
of the Patriot Act, see DONALD J. MUSCH, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE FOREIGN 
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 203–06 (2003). 
 26. See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Broad Domestic Role Asked 
for C.I.A. and the Pentagon, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2003, at A21 (noting the Bush 
administration’s efforts to grant the NSL power to the C.I.A. and the Penta-
gon); see also Barton Gellman, The FBI's Secret Scrutiny: In Hunt for Terror-
ists, Bureau Examines Records of Ordinary Americans, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 
2005, at A1 (reporting that the government issues over 30,000 NSLs each 
year). 
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rorism-related intelligence.27 A recent report from the Office of 
the Inspector General (OIG Report) indicates that the NSLs 
enable FBI agents to generate “link analyses,” one of the “prin-
cipal analytical intelligence products” generated by FBI Field 
Intelligence Groups.28 According to that same report, the gov-
ernment may use information derived from NSLs to develop a 
variety of written products that are shared with Joint Terror-
ism Task Forces.29 This Section outlines those important func-
tions and illustrates the critical value of NSLs as an antiterror-
ism tool. 
A. THE STATUTORY UNDERPINNINGS OF NSLS 
As one scholar has observed: “[s]ecrecy has been part of na-
tional security operations for as long as there has been a nation 
to secure [and] it has been problematic ever since.”30 The cur-
rent NSL regime is emblematic of the problems of secrecy as it 
has evolved into a tug-of-war in which Congress attempts to 
balance the government’s secrecy interests with the rights of 
citizens.31 Congress passed the first NSL statute32 as a modifi-
cation to the Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA) of 1978.33 
The original RFPA sought to prevent unjustified monitoring of 
a financial institution’s customers while still allowing law en-
forcement to conduct investigative work.34 In 1986, Congress 
enacted the first NSL provision, which allowed the FBI to de-
mand financial records in foreign-intelligence cases without no-
 
 27. See, e.g., Press Release, Patrick Leahy, Chairman, Senate Judiciary 
Comm., Reaction of Sen. Patrick Leahy, On the Inspector General’s Report on 
the Use of National Security Letters (Mar. 9, 2007), available at http://leahy 
.senate.gov/press/200703/030907.html (describing NSLs as “a powerful tool”). 
 28. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A 
REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S USE OF NATIONAL SE-
CURITY LETTERS, xxv (2007) [hereinafter OIG REPORT]. Perhaps because of the 
secrecy surrounding NSLs, the OIG REPORT is the only comprehensive source 
on current NSL usage. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Nathan Alexander Sales, Secrecy and National Security Investiga-
tions, 58 ALA. L. REV. 811, 811 (2007). 
 31. For a discussion of the evolution of NSL statutes, see id. at 849–54 
(discussing the legislative histories of the RFPA, FCRA, and ECPA NSL sta-
tutes). Sales notes that the various NSL secrecy requirements “are substan-
tively indistinguishable.” Id. at 852. 
 32. See Pub. L. No. 99-569, 100 Stat. 3197 (1986) (codified as amended at 
12 U.S.C.A. § 3414 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008)). 
 33. See id.  
 34. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1383, at 33 (1978). 
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tifying the subject in advance.35 Fifteen years later, the Patriot 
Act lowered that standard, and now financial institutions must 
comply with an NSL request if the FBI certifies in writing that 
the records it seeks support counterintelligence to fight inter-
national terrorism.36 
In 1986, Congress enacted the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act’s (ECPA) NSL provision—which lies at the heart of 
the Doe case.37 As originally enacted, the ECPA required the 
government to show that investigations were relevant to an on-
going criminal investigation in order to obtain a court order be-
fore instigating pen registers or trap-and-trace devices.38 The 
Patriot Act, however, amended the ECPA, allowing the FBI to 
obtain an individual’s name, address, length of service, and lo-
cal and long distance toll-billing records upon certification that 
they relate to international antiterrorism investigations.39 The 
Patriot Act also eliminated the requirement that the subject be 
a foreign-power’s agent.40 The ECPA comes with a nondisclo-
sure provision barring any recipient from disclosing that he has 
received an NSL.41 This nondisclosure order lies at the heart of 
the Doe disputes.42 
The two remaining NSL statutes are not discussed in the 
Doe cases. One came as an amendment to the National Security 
Act of 1947.43 Prompted by Aldrich Ames’s espionage investiga-
tion,44 the National Security Act NSL statute authorized the 
FBI to request financial records or other consumer reports of 
government employees targeted in investigations.45 According 
 
 35. See Pub. L. No. 99-569, 100 Stat. 3197 (1986) (codified as amended at 
12 U.S.C.A. § 3414 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008)); see also OIG REPORT, supra 
note 28, at 11–12. 
 36. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3414(a)(5)(A). 
 37. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2709 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008), invalidated by Doe 
III, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 38. See OIG REPORT, supra note 28, at 12–13 (discussing the application 
of pre-Patriot Act ECPA provisions). 
 39. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2709(b)(2). 
 40. See Sievert, supra note 21, at 338 (discussing the Patriot Act’s changes 
to the ECPA). 
 41. 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c)(1) (2000). 
 42. See, e.g., Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 379, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting 
the plaintiffs’ challenge to the constitutionality of § 2709). 
 43. See 50 U.S.C.A. § 436 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008). 
 44. See OIG REPORT, supra note 28, at 15 (“In 1994, in the wake of the es-
pionage investigation of former Central Intelligence Agency employee Aldrich 
Ames, Congress enacted an additional NSL authority by amending the Na-
tional Security Act of 1947.”). 
 45. See 50 U.S.C. § 436(a)(1)–(2)(A) (2000). 
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to available government information, these NSLs are used very 
rarely.46  
The final NSL authority comes from the Fair Credit Re-
porting Act (FCRA) of 1970.47 Since the Patriot Act, the FBI 
can issue two types of NSLs under the FCRA to obtain credit 
reports on individuals pursuant to national-security investiga-
tions.48 
B. THE CURRENT ROLE OF NSLS IN FBI INVESTIGATIONS 
NSLs might best be understood as the intelligence analo-
gue to administrative subpoenas in the criminal context.49 Ac-
cording to the OIG Report, prepared independently of the FBI, 
NSLs support a variety of key counterterrorism functions.50 
Primary among these is acquiring information to bolster FISA 
applications for other intelligence-gathering tools, such as elec-
tronic surveillance, pen registers, trap-and-trace devices, and 
physical searches.51 NSLs often provide the baseline evidence 
that justifies more intrusive investigations.52 NSLs also are key 
to linking various suspects’ communications or finances, as well 
as obtaining grounds to open new investigations or expand ex-
isting ones.53 In this way, NSLs appear to be a type of gateway 
tool preceding more elaborate procedures.54 The FBI also 
stresses that NSLs are beneficial in corroborating information 
produced in other investigations.55 The information obtained 
under NSLs may be distributed to U.S. Attorney’s Offices to aid 
prosecutions.56 Indeed, the OIG Report demonstrates that 
 
 46. See OIG REPORT, supra note 28, at xiv. 
 47. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000 & Supp. 2005). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Sievert, supra note 21, at 338 (“In the criminal context [computer and 
telephone] information has long been obtained by administrative subpoenas, 
while in the intelligence context the FBI has utilized [NSLs].”); see also Sales, 
supra note 30, at 849 (referring to NSLs as “subpoenalike authorities”). 
 50. See OIG REPORT, supra note 28, at xlvi. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. (“[NSLs] provid[e] evidence to initiate new investigations [and] ex-
pand national security investigations.”). 
 54. See id. 
 55. Id. For more discussion on the general use of NSLs, see generally Mi-
chael J. Woods, Counterintelligence and Access to Transactional Records: A 
Practical History of USA PATRIOT Act Section 215, 1 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & 
POL’Y 37, 43–50 (2005). Woods is the former chief of the FBI’s National Securi-
ty Law Unit. Id. at 37. 
 56. See OIG REPORT, supra note 28, at xlvi. 
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NSLs are noted more for their versatility than for any one par-
ticular function.57 
In practice, the use of NSLs is not “quite so sinister” as it 
may sound, according to one expert.58 NSL use is “fairly limited 
and targeted” at information that the individual has already 
disclosed to third parties anyway.59 Professor Daniel J. Solove 
has offered one illustration of how an NSL might be issued.60 
First, the FBI comes across an anonymous website proclaiming 
support for a terrorist organization and urging others to join 
the group.61 The FBI then obtains the IP address for that site 
and issues an NSL to the Internet service provider to learn the 
author’s identity.62 The nondisclosure requirement placed on 
the provider exists only to prevent a target from changing his 
behavior should he learn that he is being watched.63 
The OIG Report provides a second, real-life example of 
NSLs in action.64 The FBI, based on intelligence indicating that 
a detainee had used an e-mail account, issued NSLs to obtain 
usage information, such as URL history, on that account.65 
That information in turn led to further NSLs to obtain phone 
records for both the detainee and his associates.66 One of those 
sources linked the detainee to a different suspect, and as a re-
sult, that latter individual was later convicted for materially 
supporting terrorism.67 
From 2003 through 2005, the FBI issued 143,074 NSL re-
quests.68 In 2004, the number of requests issued jumped to 
56,507, up from 39,346 in 2003.69 However, 2005 (the most re-
cent year for which data are available) saw a decline in NSL 
 
 57. See id. 
 58. See Sievert, supra note 21, at 339. But see Caroline Fredrickson, 
American Civil Liberties Union, Statement for the Record, http://www.aclu 
.org/safefree/nationalsecurityletters/29200leg20070328.html (arguing that the 
OIG Report “confirms our worst fears” that the NSL authority is more intru-
sive and unjustified than Sievert suggests). 
 59. Sievert, supra note 21, at 339. 
 60. See Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 167 (2007). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See Sales, supra note 30, at 852. 
 64. OIG REPORT, supra note 28, at 64. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 36. 
 69. Id. at 37 fig. 4.1. 
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use, down to 47,221.70 These requests currently target U.S. 
persons at a higher rate than non-U.S. persons.71 That percen-
tage grew from about 39 percent of 2003 NSL requests to about 
53 percent of 2005 NSL requests.72 In other words, NSL use be-
came more prevalent from 2003 to 2005 and increasingly tar-
geted U.S. citizens and permanent residents. 
On the whole, the vast majority of NSL requests—over se-
venty-three percent—arise through counterterrorism investiga-
tions.73 The remaining fraction was issued in counterintelli-
gence operations and in foreign-computer-intrusion cyber 
investigations.74 In counterterrorism investigations, NSL use 
almost doubled from 2003 to 2005.75 About 19 percent of all the 
counterterrorism investigations during this period involved 
NSLs.76 However, there are no statistics available on how often 
NSLs produce information actually used in a criminal proceed-
ing.77 
The FBI does not report specific success statistics for 
NSLs, and so the public does not know the extent to which they 
aid counterterrorist efforts. Nevertheless, the FBI asserts that 
NSLs are “indispensable investigative tools that serve as build-
ing blocks in many counterterrorism and counterintelligence 
investigations.”78 The above statistics and examples at least 
confirm their frequent use. As the detainee example illustrates, 
 
 70. See id. at 37–38. 
 71. Id. The term “United States person” means: 
[A] United States citizen, an alien known by the intelligence agency 
concerned to be a permanent resident alien, an unincorporated asso-
ciation substantially composed of United States citizens or permanent 
resident aliens, or a corporation incorporated in the United States, 
except for a corporation directed and controlled by a foreign govern-
ment or governments. 
Exec. Order No. 12,333 § 3.4(i), 3 C.F.R. 200 (1982), reprinted as amended in 
50 U.S.C. § 401 (2000 & Supp. 2006); see also Exec. Order No. 13,355, 3 C.F.R. 
218 (2005), reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (2000 & Supp. 2006), 
amending Exec. Order No. 12,333, supra. 
 72. See OIG REPORT, supra note 28, at 38. 
 73. Id. at 39. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See id. at xlvi (“[B]ecause information derived from national security 
letters is not marked or tagged as such, it is impossible to determine when and 
how often the FBI provided information derived from national security letters 
to law enforcement authorities for use in criminal proceedings.”). 
 78. Id. at xlvi; see also id. at 65 (listing numerous uses for NSLs); id. at 
64–65 (discussing real-life examples of how NSLs aided specific investiga-
tions). 
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NSLs play a role in what the Supreme Court has acknowledged 
as the key intelligence task of adding “bits and pieces of data” 
to paint a broader, more useful picture.79 
C. ABUSES OF THE NSL POWER 
In addition to legitimate and lawful uses, the OIG reports 
that the FBI on numerous occasions misused NSLs.80 The OIG 
report lists eight general categories of improper NSL use.81 
These included issuing NSLs after the proper investigative au-
thority had lapsed and investigating beyond the prescribed 
time limits in the NSL.82 Most of the violations were self-
identified and properly reported to the relevant administrative 
body, although the OIG documented several instances when the 
government didn’t report violations.83 
The OIG Report also cautions the reader not to make too 
much of the abuses, because, in most cases, the FBI obtained 
information it had a right to receive, even if it had followed 
proper protocol.84 Also, no misuse of the NSL power constituted 
criminal conduct.85 As one observer noted, “there was no im-
proper use of the letters against individuals who were not legi-
timate suspects.”86 Indeed, the FBI rarely obtained information 
it had no right to receive.87 
 
 79. CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 178 (1985). One author has dubbed this 
piece-by-piece intelligence gathering as “mosaic theory,” and argues that it has 
been widely invoked by the Bush II administration to “justify numerous ac-
tions.” See Christina E. Wells, CIA v. Sims: Mosaic Theory and Government 
Attitude, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 845, 863 (2006). 
 80. See OIG REPORT, supra note 28, at 66–107 (documenting instances of 
illegal or improper use of the NSL authority). The OIG Report is the only cur-
rent source that comprehensively documents NSL misuses. 
 81. Id. at 66–67. 
 82. Id.  
 83. Id. at 67 (noting misuses of NSLs that were properly reported to the 
FBI’s Office of General Counsel as well as incidents that should have been re-
ported but were not and were instead identified by the Office of General Coun-
sel during site visits). 
 84. Id. (“[I]n most cases the FBI was seeking to obtain information that it 
could have obtained properly if it had followed its applicable statutes, guide-
lines, and internal policies.”). But see Fredrickson, supra note 58 (“[T]he FBI 
uses its NSL authorities to systematically collect private information about 
people who are not reasonably suspected of being involved in terrorism, and it 
retains this information indefinitely.”). 
 85. OIG REPORT, supra note 28, at 67 (“We also did not find any indica-
tion that the FBI’s misuse of NSL authorities constituted criminal miscon-
duct.”). 
 86. Sievert, supra note 21, at 339. Compare id. (arguing that the govern-
ment had used NSLs against legitimate suspects), with Fredrickson, supra 
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D. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE NSL AUTHORITY 
Of the four NSL statutes discussed above, the ECPA has 
generated the greatest legal controversy in recent times.88 In 
Doe I, the district court found that the statute facially unconsti-
tutional under the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments.89 
Shortly thereafter, in a case involving a different plaintiff, a 
second district court struck down ECPA’s nondisclosure re-
quirement as unconstitutional in Doe v. Gonzales (Doe II).90 It 
found that the statute failed strict scrutiny because it was not 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.91 
Before Doe I and Doe II were appealed, however, Congress 
passed the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization 
Act of 2005 (Reauthorization Act).92 This new legislation sub-
stantially altered § 2709 and expanded judicial review of 
NSLs.93 Because of these statutory changes, the Second Circuit 
remanded Doe I to the district court for consideration in light of 
the new procedures.94 
The case thus became Doe III, in which despite the statuto-
ry revisions, the anonymous company president won another 
victory. The district court rejected the nondisclosure portion of 
§ 2709(a) and parts of § 3511 as unconstitutional on First 
Amendment grounds only.95 After concluding that the plaintiffs 
did have appropriate standing to challenge the statutes at is-
sue,96 the court found that § 2709’s nondisclosure provision 
constituted a prior restraint as well as a content-based restric-
 
note 58 (“The Inspector General reviewed just a tiny proportion of NSLs is-
sued by the FBI from 2003 through 2005, yet he found an extraordinary level 
of mismanagement, incompetence, and willful misconduct . . . .”). 
 87. See Sievert, supra note, 21, at 339. 
 88. See, e.g., Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Doe II, 386 
F. Supp. 2d 66, 68–69 (D. Conn. 2005); Doe I, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 474 
(S.D.N.Y 2004), vacated, 449 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Sievert, supra 
note 21, at 339 (noting that with Doe I, “for the first time in the long history of 
the utilization of NSLs, the government was repeatedly challenged by NSL 
recipients in court”); Andrew E. Nieland, Note, National Security Letters and 
the Amended Patriot Act, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1201, 1202 (2007) (noting that 
until recently, NSL recipients “apparently never challenged their validity”). 
 89. Doe I, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 475. 
 90. See Doe II, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 82. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (codified in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3511 
(West 2006), invalidated by Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 379. 
 93. Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 386. 
 94. See Doe v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415, 419 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 95. See Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 386–87. 
 96. Id. at 396. 
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tion on speech.97 The court, therefore, applied strict scrutiny98 
and would uphold the statute “only if it is narrowly tailored to 
promote a compelling government interest, and there are no 
less restrictive alternatives [that] would be at least as effective 
in achieving the legitimate purpose that the statute was 
enacted to serve.”99 The court then considered whether the 
Reauthorization Act provides requisite safeguards to survive a 
constitutional challenge.100 First, the court found that the sta-
tute presents a licensing scheme,101 and went on to conclude 
that its validity is subject to all three prongs of the so-called 
Freedman v. Maryland test.102 Section 3511(b) could not satisfy 
the third Freedman prong, the court reasoned, because the gov-
ernment does not bear the burden of justifying the NSL re-
quest.103 For this reason, the Reauthorization Act failed to sur-
vive the First Amendment challenge.104 
Next, the court held that § 3511(b) violated the long-
standing principles of the separation of powers.105 The problem 
 
 97. Id. at 397. 
 98. Id. at 398 (noting that prior restraints and content-based speech re-
strictions traditionally require strict scrutiny); see, e.g., United States v. Play-
boy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (“If a statute regulates 
speech based on its content, it must be narrowly tailored to promote a compel-
ling Government interest.”); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 
(1963) (“Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bear-
ing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.”).  
 99. Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d. at 398 (internal quotation marks and cita-
tions omitted). 
 100. Id. at 399–401 (discussing the requirements to satisfy Freedman v. 
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) safeguards). 
 101. Id. at 400 (“As a preliminary matter, this Court finds that § 2709(c) 
does constitute a form of licensing.”). 
 102. Id. at 399–406 (noting that all three Freedman procedural safeguards 
apply); see also Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58–60 (1965). The Freed-
man case involved a film-censorship board that prohibited the screenings of 
films before the board approved them. Id. at 52. In this way, the film board 
imposed a prior restraint on film screenings, raising First Amendment issues. 
Id. The three Freedman prongs are, first, that the censor bear “the burden of 
proving that the film is unprotected expression.” Id. at 58. Second, mandatory 
advance submission of all films is permissible, but “the requirement cannot be 
administered in a manner which would lend an effect of finality to the censor’s 
determination whether a film constitutes protected expression.” Id. Third, the 
censor must, “within a specified brief period, either issue a license or go to 
court to restrain showing the film.” Id. at 59. 
 103. Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 405–06. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See id. at 411; see also Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 
(2000) (noting that congressional acts may not supersede the Supreme Court’s 
decisions interpreting the Constitution). 
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lies in § 3511(b)’s requirement that the courts “blindly credit” 
the FBI’s determination that disclosure may result in harm.106 
In other words, the statute afforded the executive branch too 
much control over the nature of the oversight any particular 
request will receive, even going so far as to dictate a judicial 
standard of review. The lack of real judicial oversight, as well 
as the potentially unlimited duration of a nondisclosure order, 
indicated that § 2709(c) was not narrowly tailored,107 providing 
further grounds for its defeat. As a final matter, the court 
found the unconstitutional portions of the statute to be non-
severable from the broader NSL power, and therefore struck 
down § 2709 in its entirety.108 
Congress responded quickly to Doe III.109 The proposed 
NSL Reform Act of 2007 allows the FBI Director (or other ap-
proved officials) to impose a thirty-day nondisclosure period 
subject to certain criteria.110 The proposal also orders the FBI 
to relinquish the nondisclosure requirement if the need for 
nondisclosure ceases prior to the thirty-day period.111 If the FBI 
wishes to extend the thirty-day period, it would apply to the 
district court for an extension.112 Even if the court grants an 
extension, the FBI must terminate the nondisclosure order if, 
at any point, the facts supporting the order cease to exist.113 
The statute stops short of prescribing a strict scrutiny 
standard for a reviewing court. Proposed § 2709(c)(6) allows a 
court to issue an ex parte order for the NSL request if “there is 
reason to believe” that disclosure will bring about one of several 
enumerated harms and that “the nondisclosure requirement is 
narrowly tailored to address the specific harm identified by the 
Government.”114 In other words, the proposed § 2709 requires 
narrow tailoring but not a “compelling government interest” as 
 
 106. Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 418. 
 107. Id. at 420–22 (concluding that the scope of the nondisclosure order 
could be narrower and noting that “it is hard to conceive of any circumstances 
that would justify a permanent bar on disclosure”). 
 108. See id. at 424–25. 
 109. See NSL Reform Act of 2007, S. 2088, 110th Cong. (2007). As of publi-
cation this bill has not yet passed. This Note does not evaluate this specific 
bill, but instead asks how a court should properly review challenges to the 
NSL regime. 
 110. See id. § 2. 
 111. See id. § 9. 
 112. See id. 
 113. See id. § 2. 
 114. See id. 
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per typical strict scrutiny.115 Congress apparently leaves it to 
courts to determine the appropriate standard of review, raising 
a question about what courts should choose. 
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY  
The heart of the Doe III decision—and the fundamental 
question future challenges must face—is whether the Constitu-
tion requires NSL statutes to pass strict scrutiny.116 One set of 
cases—including Seattle Times Company v. Rhinehart,117 But-
terworth v. Smith,118 and others cited by the Doe III court—
indicates that strict scrutiny is appropriate.119 However, be-
cause NSLs advance national-security interests, the Doe III 
court should have considered a different line of cases beginning 
with New York Times Company v. United States120 (“Pentagon 
Papers”), the “most famous case involving the publication of na-
tional security secrets.”121 This Section, then, analyzes those 
parallel sets of case law and the values that they each embody. 
A. RHINEHART, BUTTERWORTH, AND STRICT SCRUTINY 
The Rhinehart decision addressed the right to disclose, be-
fore trial, information gained in pretrial discovery.122 In consi-
dering the legality of the protective order that would prevent 
dissemination, the Supreme Court noted that First Amendment 
rights are not absolute, and that the First Amendment does not 
categorically allow individuals the right to disseminate pretrial 
discovery at any time.123 The antidissemination statute would 
survive only if it were narrowly tailored to advance an “impor-
tant or substantial” government interest.124 The Court empha-
 
 115. See Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting that 
passing strict scrutiny requires a statute to be “narrowly tailored to promote a 
compelling government interest” (citing United States v. Playboy Entm’t 
Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000))). 
 116. See Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 396–99. 
 117. See 467 U.S. 20 (1984). 
 118. See 494 U.S. 624 (1990). 
 119. See Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 403–05. 
 120. 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
 121. See Heidi Kitrosser, Classified Information Leaks and Free Speech, 
2008 U. Ill. L. Rev. 881, 897. 
 122. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 22. 
 123. Id. at 31. 
 124. Id. at 32 (“[I]t is necessary to consider whether the practice in ques-
tion [furthers] an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to 
the suppression of expression and whether the limitation of First Amendment 
freedoms [is] no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the 
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sized the public nature of the information in question125 and 
noted that because pretrial discovery is not public, “restraints 
placed on discovered, but not yet admitted, information are not 
a restriction on a traditionally public source of information.”126 
Rhinehart, therefore, represents the idea that some nondisclo-
sure statutes deserve less First Amendment scrutiny “than 
would restraints on dissemination of information in a different 
context.”127 The government may limit the dissemination of cer-
tain types of acquired information—in this case, information 
obtained through the non-public discovery process.128 
A similar issue appeared six years later in Butterworth, 
which addressed a Florida law prohibiting a grand jury witness 
from ever disclosing testimony he gave before a grand jury.129 
The Court’s review used the strict scrutiny language, calling for 
“a state interest of the highest order.”130 Notably, however, 
whatever secrecy interest the government held dies when the 
grand jury investigation concludes.131 Therefore, the govern-
ment’s interest in grand jury secrecy does not allow permanent 
nondisclosure,132 and for that reason, the Florida statute failed 
to pass constitutional muster.133 Like Rhinehart, Butterworth 
suggests that nondisclosure statutes are acceptable so long as 
they are limited in duration. 
In his Butterworth concurrence, Justice Scalia noted that 
“there is considerable doubt whether a witness can be prohi-
bited, even while the grand jury is sitting, from making public 
what he knew before he entered the grand jury room.”134 How-
ever, whether that witness can disclose the grand jury proceed-
ings—knowledge gained “only by virtue of being made a wit-
ness”—is a different matter.135 Justice Scalia suggests that the 
 
particular governmental interest involved.” (internal quotation marks and ci-
tations omitted)). 
 125. See id. at 33. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 34. 
 128. Id.  
 129. Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 626 (1990). 
 130. Id. at 632 (citing Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) and Smith v. 
Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 635–36. 
 134. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 135. See id. 
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state may have a sufficient interest in prohibiting a witness 
from disclosing that acquired knowledge.136 
Kamasinki v. Judicial Review Council also considered 
similar statutory confidentiality provisions.137 At issue was a 
Connecticut statute that governed the Judicial Review Council 
(JRC), the body that investigates complaints against judges.138 
Using strict scrutiny,139 the Second Circuit held that the sta-
tute’s nondisclosure provision did not violate the First Amend-
ment.140 The First Amendment allows a state, with sufficient 
interest in doing so, to “prohibit a complainant’s disclosure of 
the fact that he has filed a complaint, or a witness’s disclosure 
of the fact that he has testified . . . .”141 The court also found 
that it would be constitutional to prohibit disclosure of informa-
tion acquired through JRC interaction.142 
The Doe III court mentioned additional cases—including 
United States v. Aguilar,143 Hoffmann-Pugh v. Keenan,144 and 
Freedman v. Maryland145—that illustrate the proper applica-
tion of strict scrutiny.146 In particular, Freedman involved the 
constitutionality of a Maryland statute that required movie 
theaters to submit films to a state censorship board prior to 
public screenings.147 Finding the censorship system a prior re-
straint on speech, the Court noted that prior restraints bear a 
heavy presumption against their constitutionality.148 To miti-
gate the dangers of censorship, the Court established three pro-
cedural safeguards.149 First, the censor must show that the film 
falls outside protected expression.150 Second, mandatory ad-
vance submission of all films is permissible, but the process 
 
 136. See id. 
 137. 44 F.3d 106, 108 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 109 (“We agree that the restrictions here are content-based, and 
that strict scrutiny is the correct standard.”). 
 140. Id. at 108. 
 141. Id. at 111. 
 142. Id. 
 143. 515 U.S. 593 (1995). 
 144. 338 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 145. 380 U.S. 51 (1965). 
 146. See Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (discussing 
Aguilar); id. at 395 (referencing Hoffmann-Pugh); id. at 399–407 (discussing 
and applying Freedman). 
 147. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 52. 
 148. Id. at 57. 
 149. Id. at 58–59. 
 150. Id. 
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may not “lend an effect of finality” to the censor’s judgment.151 
In other words, any valid final restraint requires a judicial de-
termination.152 Third, the censor must, “within a specified brief 
period,” license the film or file for restraint in court.153 The goal 
in such a requirement is to mitigate the dangers of an inappro-
priate license denial, and there is a clear emphasis on the gov-
ernment’s responsibility of bearing the burden.154 
A licensing scheme does not automatically fall within 
Freedman’s territory.155 For example, the Supreme Court noted 
in Thomas v. Chicago Park District that Freedman does not ap-
ply to “[a] content-neutral time, place, and manner” regulation 
of the use of a public forum.156 However, the Doe III court held 
that the NSL nondisclosure orders are content-based, and that 
there are no grounds for believing that Freedman’s safeguards 
would not apply.157 
B. THE PENTAGON PAPERS, THE ESPIONAGE ACT, AND JUDICIAL 
DEFERENCE 
NSLs, as the name suggests, invoke issues of national se-
curity, and it is appropriate to examine whether a special stan-
dard should apply. Both the Pentagon Papers case158 and sub-
sequent prosecutions under the Espionage Act of 1917159 
suggest that the executive branch deserves more leeway in 
matters of national security than strict scrutiny allows.160 
 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 58–59. 
 154. Id. at 59. 
 155. See Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379, 400–01 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“Since 
Freedman, the Supreme Court has addressed a broad range of licensing sys-
tems, and it has decided, on a case-by-case basis, whether Freedman’s proce-
dural protections are required to validate the licensing at issue.”).  
 156. See Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 322 (2002) (“We have 
never required that a content-neutral permit scheme regulating speech in a 
public forum adhere to the procedural requirements set forth in Freedman.”). 
For a general discussion of content-based versus content-neutral restrictions 
on speech, see Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, 
Illegal Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted 
Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1286–93 (2005). 
 157. See Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 400–01 (“There is no basis justifying a 
conclusion that Freedman is limited to cases involving obscenity or sexually-
oriented expression, as the Government suggests, or that it is somehow not 
applicable to cases that involve national security.”). 
 158. 403 U.S. 713, 713 (1971). 
 159. 18 U.S.C. § 793 (2000). 
 160. See, e.g., id.; N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 741 (Marshall, J., concur-
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The Pentagon Papers was not prosecuted under the Espio-
nage Act; rather, the government was seeking a preliminary in-
junction against The New York Times.161 The government’s 
purpose was to prevent The New York Times from revealing the 
decision-making process that led to the Vietnam War.162 The 
Supreme Court denied the injunction solely on First Amend-
ment grounds.163 
In the concurrences and dissents, however, lies the notion 
that even though an injunction was improper in this particular 
case, there may nevertheless be circumstances in which “the 
First Amendment [would] permit an injunction against pub-
lishing information about government plans or operations.”164 
Justice White even admitted that publishing the information at 
stake in Pentagon Papers “will do substantial damage to public 
interests”165 and hinted that although an injunction was inap-
propriate here, that “does not mean that [the government] 
could not successfully proceed in another way.”166 The difficult 
task becomes guessing what alternative direction might have 
been successful. 
Dissenting Justice Harlan took a stronger view.167 He 
called upon the judiciary to review the President’s initial de-
termination and to ensure that the President had not exceeded 
the scope of his foreign-policy power.168 This view concedes sig-
nificant power to the Executive. The role of the Court is merely 
to review the Executive’s determination and to guarantee that 
an individual of appropriate authority makes the necessary de-
termination.169 These two inquiries, according to Justice Har-
lan, formed the judiciary’s limit because executive decisions on 
foreign policy are inherently political rather than judicial.170 
These “are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has nei-
 
ring); see also United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1057 (4th Cir. 1988); 
United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 602 (E.D. Va. 2000). 
 161. See Kitrosser, supra note 121, at 897. However, some Supreme Court 
Justices did invoke the Espionage Act in their concurrences. See N.Y. Times 
Co., 403 U.S. at 720–21 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 162. See N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714, 717. 
 163. See id.; Kitrosser, supra note 121, at 897. 
 164. N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 731 (White, J., concurring). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 733. 
 167. See id. at 757 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 756–57. 
 170. Id. 
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ther aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and which has long 
been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject 
to judicial intrusion or inquiry.”171 Most importantly, Justice 
Harlan argued that, “the scope of review must be exceedingly 
narrow” with appropriate deference to the judgment of a co-
equal branch “operating within the field of its constitutional 
prerogative.”172 He argued that executive branch officers must 
be given an opportunity to explain the relevance of the national 
security issue, and the ensuing judicial review “should be in ac-
cordance with the views expressed in this opinion.”173 This rea-
soning seems to suggest that in cases in which the Executive 
has acted to advance his constitutional responsibilities of en-
suring national security, the judiciary is not equipped to judge 
the effectiveness of the actions, and the Executive must be giv-
en a significant amount of leeway. 
Justice Blackmun also dissented and emphasized the pow-
ers of Article II.174 Noting that Article II vests the foreign af-
fairs power in the Executive and charges that branch with 
maintaining national security, he argued against First 
Amendment absolutism at the expense of “downgrading other 
provisions.”175 He asserted that “there are situations where re-
straint is in order and is constitutional,” and times of war may 
allow different restrictions than times of peace.176 He did not 
provide specific examples, but he at least left open the possibili-
ty that legitimate Article II interests may trump the First 
Amendment. 
Even Justice Stewart’s concurrence suggested great defe-
rence to Executive decisions.177 He found it obvious that main-
taining national security requires confidentiality and secre-
cy.178 He argued that the Constitution’s grant of “unshared 
power” to the Executive bestows a constitutional “duty” to “pro-
tect the confidentiality necessary to carry out its responsibili-
ties in the fields of international relations and national de-
 
 171. Id. at 757–58 (citing Chi. & Se. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 
U.S. 103, 111 (1948)). 
 172. Id. at 758.  
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 759–63 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 175. Id. at 761. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 727–28 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 178. Id. at 728 (“In the area of basic national defense the frequent need for 
absolute secrecy is, of course, self-evident.”). 
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fense.”179 Stewart, then, at least argued for a highly deferential 
approach to the Executive on matters of national security, even 
advocating suppression of some of the documents at issue in 
Pentagon Papers.180 
Of course, these dissents did not carry the day and the ma-
jority held that the preliminary injunction was unwarranted 
and rejected special treatment for issues of national security.181 
That does not mean, however, that a court today should disre-
gard the dissenting views. First, Pentagon Papers came shortly 
after the end of the Warren Court, a time when the U.S. Su-
preme Court rapidly expanded civil rights and prioritized indi-
vidual liberties above other interests.182 The rights-focused val-
ues of that era might not sway today’s more conservative 
Supreme Court. Second, the Pentagon Papers majority ac-
knowledged that future courts need not duplicate its reasoning. 
Justice Brennan, for example, suggests that a similar future 
case could justifiably reach a different outcome.183 
These various Pentagon Papers opinions suggest that at 
least a large minority of the Court would grant the Executive a 
highly deferential review standard when deciding issues of na-
tional security. These opinions do not explicitly advocate in-
termediate scrutiny—as opposed to strict scrutiny—or some 
other named standard. Yet Justices Harlan, Blackmun, and 
Stewart’s views certainly suggest that the high burden of strict 
scrutiny may not always be appropriate. 
 
 179. Id. at 729–30. 
 180. Id. at 730. Justice Stewart filed a concurrence rather than a dissent 
because “no statutes or regulations authorized the punishment sought and be-
cause the very high threshold for imposing a prior restraint without such au-
thorization was not clearly met. Notably, he lamented that the Court had been 
asked “to perform a function that the Constitution gave to the Executive, not 
the Judiciary.” Kitrosser, supra note 121, at 898–99 (quoting N.Y. Times Co., 
403 U.S. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring)). 
 181. N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714. 
 182. See Rebecca E. Zietlow, The Judicial Restraint of the Warren Court 
(and Why it Matters), 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 255, 257 (“The many ‘activist’ rulings of 
the Warren Court expanding individual rights and the jurisdiction of federal 
courts are the paradigmatic example of courts protecting the rights of minori-
ties. Indeed, in academia and in politics, the Warren Court is still synonymous 
with judicial activism.”). 
 183. See N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 724–25 (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(“[O]ur judgments in the present cases may not be taken to indicate the pro-
priety, in the future, of issuing temporary stays and restraining orders to 
block the publication of material sought to be suppressed by the Govern-
ment.”). 
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Cases emerging from the Espionage Act of 1917 provide 
additional support for this view. According to the Bush admin-
istration, the Espionage Act “provides a statutory basis to pros-
ecute both government employees who leak classified informa-
tion, and journalists and members of the public who pass on or 
even willingly receive such information.”184 Nevertheless, at 
present, only two prosecutions have been brought under the Act 
“outside of a classic espionage or spying context.”185 The 
Court’s’ approach to these cases suggests a model for the NSL 
controversy. 
United States v. Morison considered an Espionage Act con-
viction.186 The defendant was convicted on four counts, the first 
of which involved illegally leaking secured satellite photo-
graphs to the press.187 Affirming his conviction, the Fourth Cir-
cuit observed that it “[did] not perceive any First Amendment 
rights to be implicated here” because the defendant was a gov-
ernment employee who knowingly and willfully broke protocol 
in releasing the photographs.188 The First Amendment does not 
provide license to violate valid criminal laws, and the mere fact 
that a news organization was involved did not bring about spe-
cial First Amendment protections.189 
However, in his concurrence, Circuit Judge Wilkinson sug-
gested that the First Amendment was implicated in this 
case.190 He argued that while First Amendment issues are 
usually subject to an “aggressive balancing” of the interests in-
volved, issues of national security should bring greater judicial 
deference to the “political branches” of government.191 For a 
First Amendment claim, he noted, “the Court has held that 
government restrictions that would otherwise be impermissible 
may be sustained where national security and foreign policy 
are implicated.”192 In the interest of separation of powers, the 
judiciary needs to recognize the compelling interest in preserv-
 
 184. Kitrosser, supra note 121, at 883. 
 185. Id. at 882. The cases referenced are Morison and Rosen. Id. The Mori-
son court acknowledged that this was not a case of “classic” spying. See United 
States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1070 (4th Cir. 1988). 
 186. Morison, 844 F.2d at 1060. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 1068. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 1082. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
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ing secrecy in these situations.193 “[A]ggressive balancing,” he 
argued, is not required.194 
The second relevant Espionage Act prosecution, United 
States v. Rosen, involved two pro-Israel lobbyists.195 Respond-
ing to their lobbying efforts, the government alleged that the 
two defendants built relationships with government officials 
who had special access to sensitive government information. 
Additionally, the government claimed that the defendants ob-
tained information through those relationships and transmit-
ted it to unauthorized persons, including foreign government 
officials.196 As in Morison, the facts implicated matters of na-
tional security.197 As a preliminary matter, the court deter-
mined that the First Amendment applied.198 Prosecutions un-
der the Espionage Act “unquestionably” merit First 
Amendment scrutiny,199 with the crucial caveat that “the rights 
protected by the First Amendment must at times yield to the 
need for national security.”200 Unfortunately, the Rosen court 
does not define those times explicitly. 
The Rosen court left no doubt that a government employee 
who signed a secrecy agreement and leaked classified informa-
tion in bad faith does not receive First Amendment protec-
tion.201 The more difficult cases involve those who have not vi-
 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. The reference to “[a]ggressive balancing” appears to rule out the 
use of the strict scrutiny standard, or at least to provide justification for apply-
ing intermediate scrutiny. Id. As one author has noted, “the Supreme Court 
has never discussed whether intermediate scrutiny should apply in this con-
text, [but] the Court has indicated that it may be willing to subject secrecy sta-
tutes, such as the NSL nondisclosure provisions, to greater regulation. This 
leeway should allow a court to apply intermediate scrutiny.” Brett A. Shu-
mate, Comment, Thou Shalt Not Speak: The Nondisclosure Provisions of the 
National Security Letter Statutes and the First Amendment Challenge, 41 
GONZ. L. REV. 151, 167 (2006) (rejecting the Doe I court’s decision to apply 
strict scrutiny on the Butterworth reasoning). 
 195. See United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 607 (E.D. Va. 2006); 
Kitrosser, supra note 121, at 900. 
 196. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 608. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 630 (“In the broadest terms, the conduct at issue—collecting in-
formation about the United States’ foreign policy and discussing that informa-
tion with government officials (both United States and foreign), journalists, 
and other participants in the foreign policy establishment—is at the core of 
the First Amendment’s guarantees.”). 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 634. 
 201. Id. at 636. 
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olated any nondisclosure pact with the government202—such as, 
perhaps, the Internet company president in Doe III, who never 
voluntarily agreed to nondisclosure. These individuals, the Ro-
sen court reasons, merit stronger First Amendment protec-
tions.203 Nevertheless, even with heightened protection, Con-
gress still may constitutionally limit disclosure of secret 
information in “situations in which national security is ge-
nuinely at risk.”204 Both the Rosen defendants and the Doe 
plaintiffs should fall within that category. The theme from the 
Pentagon Papers dissents and Morison case continues: national 
security deserves special consideration in First Amendment 
cases. The Doe III court did not appear to give national security 
any special consideration in its decision to declare § 2709(c) un-
constitutional. 
III. COURTS SHOULD APPLY INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY 
IN FUTURE NSL REVIEWS  
Certainly, the Executive may not obtain license to do any-
thing it wishes simply by invoking “national security.” That no-
tion runs entirely contrary to First Amendment principles. As 
Judge Wilkinson noted, “[t]he First Amendment interest in in-
formed popular debate does not simply vanish at the invocation 
of the words ‘national security.’”205 The Rosen court also stated 
that “the mere invocation of ‘national security’ or ‘government 
secrecy’ does not foreclose a First Amendment inquiry.”206 At 
the same time, the Supreme Court has also observed that “[i]t 
is obvious and unarguable that no governmental interest is 
more compelling than the security of the Nation.”207 This Sec-
tion seeks to strike a balance among those values and examines 
whether secrecy is equally compelling. 
A. NSLS SUBSTANTIALLY ADVANCE NATIONAL-SECURITY 
INTERESTS AND SECRECY PLAYS AN INTEGRAL ROLE 
As discussed above, Congress recognizes the high value of 
NSLs and made it easier for the FBI to issue NSLs under the 
ECPA.208 The nondisclosure orders preserve secrecy, which, ac-
 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 636–37. 
 204. Id. at 639. 
 205. United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1081 (4th Cir. 1988). 
 206. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 630. 
 207. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (citations omitted). 
 208. See Sievert, supra note 21, at 338. 
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cording to one scholar, advances the “heart of intelligence oper-
ations.”209 One might object, however, that NSLs simply do not 
analogize to the grand intelligence instruments in, for example, 
Pentagon Papers, in which The New York Times sought to pub-
lish an historical account of how the U.S. became involved in 
the Vietnam War.210 NSLs also are admittedly much smaller in 
scope than even the intelligence at issue in Rosen, in which two 
lobbyists obtained classified information and shared it with a 
foreign government. NSL recipients, by contrast, merely want 
to notify their customers that the FBI is watching them. Never-
theless, NSLs’ smaller scale should not detract from their role 
in advancing crucial national security issues. 
Furthermore, preserving secrecy in NSL investigations 
prevents enemies from obtaining compromising information. As 
one scholar has pointed out, seemingly small and trivial pieces 
of information—such as disclosure of an NSL recipient—can 
mean a great deal to espionage experts.211 There is a danger 
that foreign powers may “be able to discern from the individual 
tiles the larger intelligence mosaic.”212 Large-scale security 
leaks are obviously harmful, but even “innocuous disclosures” 
can compromise national objectives.213 
It is true, as some critics have noted, that needless nondis-
closure can actually have a harmful effect.214 Imposing unwar-
ranted nondisclosure orders unfairly reduces public access to 
information about NSLs. The Senate appears to recognize this 
problem in Senate Bill 2088,215 which requires the FBI to lift 
the nondisclosure order when the need for secrecy has elapsed 
or expired. The Senate should ensure that this type of safe-
guard attaches to any future NSL legislation in order to avoid 
the dangers of unnecessary gag orders. 
 
 209. Sales, supra note 30, at 818 (citing CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 167 
(1985)). 
 210. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714, 717 (1971); 
Kitrosser, supra note 121, at 897. 
 211. Sales, supra note 30, at 819–20. 
 212. Id. at 820 (citations omitted). 
 213. Id. at 819. 
 214. See Meredith Fuchs, Judging Secrets: The Role Courts Should Play in 
Preventing Unnecessary Secrecy, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 136 (2006) (describing 
classification as a “double-edged sword” and noting that unnecessary secrets 
impose “real costs” that undermine the legitimacy of government (citations 
omitted)). 
 215. See NSL Reform Act of 2007, S. 2088, 110th Cong. (2007). 
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There is no serious doubt that NSLs advance national-
security interests, and that NSL secrecy is necessary in most 
cases. A single disclosure of an NSL may appear small-scale yet 
have much broader ripple effects, and so NSLs should be 
treated as any other serious national-security device and given 
the same type of judicial review. 
B. DEVISING THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. The Justification for Strict Scrutiny is Unpersuasive 
The Doe III court justifies its application of strict scrutiny 
based on the Rhinehart-Butterworth-Freedman line of cases, 
but its reasoning appears unsatisfying given the subject mat-
ter. The Doe III court summarizes First Amendment principles 
as follows: any nondisclosure order “on information acquired by 
way of a confidential government investigation” will likely sa-
tisfy strict scrutiny based on two key factors.216 Those are “the 
compelling government interest in keeping ongoing investiga-
tions secret, and the safeguard that the restraint is necessarily 
narrowly tailored to curtail the minimum of speech.”217 The suf-
ficiency of those safeguards, the court notes, may be tested via 
Freedman.218 
Section 2709(c) provides that if the FBI Director (or other 
approved official) “certifies that otherwise there may result a 
danger to the national security of the United States” or other 
harm, “no wire or electronic communication service provider, or 
officer, employee, or agent thereof, shall disclose to any per-
son . . . that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has sought or 
obtained access to information or records under this section.”219 
This language grants the FBI, the Doe III court notes, “broad 
discretion” on a case-by-case basis “to grant some NSL reci-
pients permission to disclose certain information pertaining to 
their receipt of an NSL and to deny others that freedom.”220 
The court’s primary objection is that the FBI has unfettered 
authority to decide who may and may not speak.221 This power 
 
 216. Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2709(c) (West 2000 & Supp. 2008). 
 220. Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 400. 
 221. Id. (“[T]he FBI, based on its own case-by-case assessment, now has 
broad discretion to grant some NSL recipients permission to disclose certain 
information pertaining to their receipt of an NSL and to deny others that free-
dom.”). 
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appears analogous to that of the censorship board in Freedman, 
which had broad authority to approve or deny films for content-
based reasons according to its own discretion.222 The Doe III 
court therefore mandated the application of the Freedman sa-
feguards.223 Under the Reauthorization Act, the government 
does not bear the burden of going to court to enforce the non-
disclosure order.224 Plainly, § 3511(b) achieves the opposite ef-
fect by requiring the NSL recipient to take his challenge to 
court.225 Finding this burden at least as onerous as that of the 
plaintiffs in Freedman, the Doe III court ruled that § 3511(b) 
fails Freedman requirements, and is therefore unconstitution-
al.226 
However, this interpretation of Freedman fails to account 
for the vastly different subject matter at issue in NSL chal-
lenges.227 NSL nondisclosure orders do not analogize to film 
censorship: the latter relates to the appropriateness of enter-
tainment, while the former concerns saving American lives and 
prosecuting terrorists. In the same way, NSLs are distinguish-
able from the secrecy required in grand jury proceedings for 
common crimes (as per Butterworth).228 NSLs have played a 
key role in fighting international terrorism; grand jury secrecy 
does not promote goals of such magnitude. The Supreme Court 
has declared that the Constitution “is not a suicide pact.”229 
When national security is at stake, film screenings do not merit 
the same treatment as NSLs. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court indicated that strict 
scrutiny applies if the government has imposed speech restric-
 
 222. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 52 (1965). 
 223. Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 401. 
 224. Id. 
 225. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3511(b) (West 2006); see also Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 
401.  
 226. Doe III, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 406. 
 227. See generally JAMES E. BAKER, IN THE COMMON DEFENSE: NATIONAL 
SECURITY LAW FOR PERILOUS TIMES 13 (2007) (arguing that national security 
issues invoke different legal concerns). The article notes that invoking nation-
al security “has obvious ramifications in a constitutional climate where presi-
dents have long asserted authority to use force as commander in chief, without 
express congressional authorization, and to employ instruments of intelligence 
without legislative or judicial review.” Id.  
 228. See Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 626 (1990) (“We hold that in-
sofar as the Florida law prohibits a grand jury witness from disclosing his own 
testimony after the term of the grand jury has ended, it violates the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.”). 
 229. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963). 
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tions for agreeing or disagreeing with a particular message or 
viewpoint.230 The Supreme Court declared as much in R.A.V. v. 
City of St. Paul.231 The important distinction in NSL nondisclo-
sure cases is that the government does not object to the mes-
sage that NSLs are a bad thing; the OIG Report and Washing-
ton Post editorial demonstrate the government’s acceptance of 
an anti-NSL view.232 This is not a case in which the govern-
ment allows pro-NSL speech but suppresses dissent. An ISP 
who publicly applauds an NSL he received violates the law as 
much as another ISP who decries it. This situation appears to 
fall outside the primary purpose of strict scrutiny, making its 
application here further suspect. 
2. Intermediate Scrutiny Offers a Better Solution 
One means of arguing that the Doe III court erred is to 
suggest that under the Butterworth-Kamasinski reasoning, the 
nondisclosure order in § 2709(c) is in reality neither a prior re-
straint on speech nor a content-based restriction, but is instead 
a content-neutral order. Therefore, intermediate scrutiny ap-
plies. The government argued accordingly in its brief to the 
court,233 and NSL scholars have taken a similar approach.234 
Because that argument has failed twice—in Doe I and III—
future courts need a novel approach to justify intermediate 
scrutiny. In other words, even if NSL nondisclosure is a prior 
restraint or content-based restriction, it still merits only inter-
 
 230. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) 
(noting the reasons for strict scrutiny review). 
 231. 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“The First Amendment generally prevents 
government from proscribing speech . . . because of disapproval of the ideas 
expressed.” (citations omitted)). 
 232. See OIG REPORT, supra note 28; Editorial, supra note 2. 
 233. See Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment and in Support of the Government's Cross-Motion to Dismiss 
the Complaint Or For Summary Judgment, Doe I, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (No. 04 Civ. 2614), vacated, 449 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(“First, § 2709(c) does not impose a ‘prior restraint’ on speech” because the sta-
tute “does not create any licensing system . . . . Second, § 2709(c) is not the 
type of ‘content-based’ restriction that requires traditional strict scrutiny . . . 
.”). 
 234. See, e.g., Shumate, supra note 194, 166–67 (“[T]he Doe [I] court incor-
rectly selected and applied strict scrutiny in its analysis of the nondisclosure 
provision . . . .”). That Comment appeared prior to the Doe III decision and the 
passage of the Reauthorization Act and did not argue for intermediate scruti-
ny on national security grounds. Because the Doe I and Doe III courts have 
rejected this line of reasoning, this Note now propounds an alternative justifi-
cation for intermediate scrutiny. 
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mediate scrutiny because important national security issues 
are at stake. 
Intermediate scrutiny avoids the practical inconsistency 
that the Rosen court noted in its analysis of Pentagon Papers.235 
The Rosen court drew a distinction between imposing a prior 
restraint on speech and punishing illegally leaked speech.236 
The Supreme Court usually applies a “heavy presumption” that 
prior restraints on speech are unconstitutional.237 As the Rosen 
court suggests, however, the government might have prevailed 
in Pentagon Papers if it had prosecuted the newspapers via the 
Espionage Act post-publication rather than seeking an injunc-
tion pre-publication. The majority of the opinions in Pentagon 
Papers reflect a general abhorrence for prior restraints on 
speech.238 Yet later federal courts have willingly prosecuted in-
dividuals for espionage after they have already leaked informa-
tion.239 Strict scrutiny, as seen in Doe, invalidated a so-called 
prior restraint on speech when that speech might be illegal an-
yway under the Espionage Act. 
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the First 
Amendment does not bar prosecution for treasonous speech.240 
But it is inconsistent to refuse to restrain speech only to prose-
cute the speaker once the words are said. A better solution 
would be to accept that certain information may or may not be 
released. If disclosure of particular materials would subject the 
leak to a valid criminal prosecution, then there is no reason for 
a court to deny issuing a preliminary injunction simply to pre-
serve strict scrutiny review of prior restraints. The interme-
diate scrutiny requirements, as discussed below, allow nondis-
closure orders to pass constitutional muster, thereby avoiding 
the problem of allowing speech to occur yet prosecuting it sub-
sequent to its occurrence. 
 
 235. United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 638 (E.D. Va. 2006). 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 701, 714–15 (1971) 
(Black, J., concurring) (“I believe that every moment's continuance of the in-
junctions against these newspapers amounts to a flagrant, indefensible, and 
continuing violation of the First Amendment.”). 
 239. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992). 
 240. See, e.g., id. at 389 (“[W]ords can in some circumstances violate laws 
directed not against speech but against conduct (a law against treason, for ex-
ample, is violated by telling the enemy the Nation's defense secrets). . . .”). 
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3. Because of the Subject Matter, Case Law Supports 
Intermediate Scrutiny241 
The Doe III decision, in its application of strict scrutiny, 
overlooks the vast body of case law indicating that issues of na-
tional security deserve different treatment. Those cases, such 
as Morison, promote the importance of deference to the Execu-
tive without explicitly advocating intermediate scrutiny.242 A 
major objection, then, to the use of intermediate scrutiny is 
that there are no major First Amendment cases of prior re-
straint and content-based restrictions in which a majority of 
the Court held that intermediate scrutiny was appropriate.243 
One possible response to this objection is that courts have fo-
cused on achieving specific outcomes in individual cases rather 
than developing a coherent long-term jurisprudence. Therefore, 
if a court applies strict scrutiny but automatically gives the ap-
propriate deference to an executive foreign policy decision, the 
result is no different from applying intermediate scrutiny.244 
When courts deciding national security cases grant substantial 
leeway to an executive determination as the Pentagon Papers 
concurrences and dissents suggest they should, they are in fact 
applying intermediate scrutiny review. 
Furthermore, true strict scrutiny calls for a level of inquiry 
that might force the executive branch to disclose information 
that should be kept secret. Secrecy is necessary to protect “the 
Executive’s intelligence sources and methods, or information 
about the manner in which the government collects intelli-
gence.”245 Compromising those sources “can have devastating 
consequences” such as allowing enemies to evade detection, 
hindering strikes on foreign powers, and even opening the na-
tion to “assaults against American interests.”246 Justice Har-
 
 241. As noted earlier, other authors have made the argument that the very 
framework on which Doe III is built (such as Butterworth) already provides 
case law justification for intermediate scrutiny. This Section takes a different 
approach by examining national security cases instead. See supra note 234 
and accompanying text. 
 242. See, e.g., United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1082 (1988). 
 243. See BAKER, supra note 227, at 16 (“Judicial treatments of ‘national 
security’ also vary, in part, because courts tend to be guided by the specific 
case or controversy presented rather than a desire to find central and lasting 
constitutional constructions.”). 
 244. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (purporting to 
apply strict scrutiny while deferring to President Roosevelt’s foreign policy de-
cision). 
 245. Sales, supra note 30, at 818. 
 246. Id. 
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lan’s Pentagon Papers dissent indicated a limited role for the 
judiciary in this type of situation. As described above, NSLs fall 
within the ambit of the Executive’s “foreign power,” and their 
disclosure could “irreparably impair the national security.”247 
When courts delve into these matters, the proper review stan-
dard should be as limited as intermediate scrutiny allows.248 
Some observers rightfully counter that disclosure of classi-
fied information constitutes “very high value speech” because 
speech concerning government activities “is at the core of the 
First Amendment’s value.”249 Since the government-related 
speech is the First Amendment’s focus, this argument goes, 
courts must “strongly protect classified information dissemina-
tion by the press and public.”250 Free speech is weakened, 
moreover, if nondisclosure prevents the public from learning 
more information about NSLs.251 The current First Amendment 
provisions in the NSL—which require FBI certification that the 
NSL is not conducted on the basis of First Amendment activi-
ties—do not sufficiently protect First Amendment rights,252 and 
only strict scrutiny provides a real check on the Executive’s 
power and prevents abuse.253 
However, in the context of NSLs, these arguments are not 
persuasive. NSL disclosures are distinguishable from the type 
of disclosure at issue in Pentagon Papers. In that case, The New 
York Times, at the height of the Vietnam War, sought to pub-
 
 247. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 701, 757 (1971) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). 
 248. Kitrosser, supra note 121, at 909 (noting that the judiciary already 
closely scrutinizes national security rationales for speech suppression). But see 
BAKER, supra note 227, at 27 (“[T]he inclusion of the legislative or judicial 
branches [does not] necessarily undermine the national security requirements 
for speed and secrecy. . . . [T]he government’s most sensitive secrets can be 
subject to external judicial validation without disclosure.”). 
 249. Kitrosser, supra note 121, at 906. 
 250. Id. at 923. 
 251. See Fuchs, supra note 214, at 141 (“Freedom of speech and the right to 
petition the government for redress of grievances are weak rights if govern-
ment officials withhold information necessary to a complete understanding of 
the issue in controversy.”). 
 252. See Solove, supra note 60, at 168. 
 253. See Susan M. Herman, The USA Patriot Act and the Submajoritarian 
Fourth Amendment, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 67, 129 (2006) (arguing that 
because a simple balancing test “between liberty and security” tends to “stack 
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not be reduced); see also BAKER, supra note 227, at 22 (noting that because 
matters of security are concrete and the preservation of “liberty” is abstract, 
policymakers tend to favor bolstering security). 
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lish secret documents that revealed how the United States be-
came involved in the war.254 For the public, the documents con-
stituted new information that shed light on the substantive de-
cision making at the highest levels of government; it was the 
type of information that an informed citizenry would want to 
know. NSL disclosures are a different matter because they do 
not reveal any new information about the government’s activi-
ties. Thanks to the recent and comprehensive OIG Report, 
which is freely available over the Internet, the general public 
already has ample information about the existence and use of 
NSLs. Thus, if the company president of Doe III were to dis-
close that he had received an NSL, he would not be providing 
any new information to the national debate except that his own 
particular customers may be under surveillance, which would 
defeat the NSL’s purpose. 
In any case, the company president was not prohibited 
from sharing his views on NSLs; the government did not prose-
cute him for his Washington Post editorial. Even in the national 
forum, he was free to express the NSL’s impact on his life and 
why he felt it was inappropriate. The catch is that he had to do 
so anonymously, which only further indicates that the govern-
ment supports public debate on NSLs so long as its specific in-
dividual targets are not alerted that they are under surveil-
lance. 
There are two serious reasons to allow the company presi-
dent to reveal his name. First, personifying an NSL request al-
lows the public to place a human face and name on the NSL re-
gime. The public may not care about anonymous, ethereal NSL 
recipients, but if the public knew that the popular and res-
pected John Doe had received an NSL request, it might feel dif-
ferently about the value of NSLs. This argument has some 
weight, but it is ultimately less compelling than the strong 
needs for secrecy. The public already has information that tele-
communications providers generally are subject to NSL re-
quests, and that the FBI issued over 47,000 such requests in 
2005.255 Furthermore, the public need not dig up obscure publi-
cations like the OIG Report; even The Washington Post in 2005 
reported on widespread NSL usage.256 The most significant in-
 
 254. See supra notes 159–63163 and accompanying text. 
 255. See OIG REPORT, supra note 28, at 36. 
 256. See Barton Gellman, The FBI's Secret Scrutiny: In Hunt for Terrorists, 
Bureau Examines Records of Ordinary Americans, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2005, 
at A1; see also Herman, supra note 253, at 87 (“The public learned from a 2005 
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formation about NSLs is already publicly available, and what-
ever value personification adds should not trump the govern-
ment’s undisputed need for secrecy. 
The second reason not to allow the company president to 
reveal his name is that if the company president were allowed 
to speak openly about his NSL request, his customers would 
know that they are being watched, and they could temper their 
activities accordingly or, alternatively, decide to play a role in 
the national debate on NSLs. But notifying these individuals—
law-abiding or otherwise—that they are being watched may de-
feat the purpose of the NSL regime. NSL secrecy preserves on-
going investigations. One expert notes that “[i]f a target discov-
ers he is under surveillance, he might flee or go into hiding.”257 
The company president’s sense of personal duty to clients can-
not trump the government’s legitimate and necessary investig-
ative methods that preserve national security. 
Civil libertarians may also object to the use of intermediate 
scrutiny because it can lead to increased FBI investigation into 
private activity. The targets, this argument goes, deserve high-
er protection, and strict scrutiny will improve the chances of an 
ISP warning its customers that they are being watched.258 Fur-
thermore, limiting some rights sends the nation down a slip-
pery slope in which more and more important liberties are 
threatened.259 This argument fails to note, however, that the 
targets have already willingly given the information the gov-
ernment seeks—URLs, e-mail addresses, phone records, and 
the like—to the ISP, a third party. When Internet users type a 
URL into a browser, they do so knowing that their ISP can 
track that address the same way that a postal carrier can see 
the destination addresses of outgoing letters he or she picks up. 
NSLs do not let the FBI into specific e-mails to read their con-
tent, but they do allow the FBI to see an e-mail’s recipient, 
 
Washington Post article, rather than a government report or court order, that 
the FBI has issued more than 30,000 National Security Letters a year, an as-
tronomical increase over ‘historic norms.’”). 
 257. Sales, supra note 30, at 821. 
 258. See, e.g., Solove, supra note 60, at 167–68 (“The blogger’s political ex-
pression may be substantially chilled by the government’s actions. . . . Given 
the blogger’s radical and unpopular beliefs, she might be speaking anonymous-
ly precisely in order to shield her identity from the government.”). 
 259. But see AMITAI ETZIONI, HOW PATRIOTIC IS THE PATRIOT ACT?: FREE-
DOM VERSUS SECURITY IN THE AGE OF TERRORISM 39 (2004) (“It is true that 
almost any of the new security measures may threaten our rights if used wan-
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which is information the target has already relinquished. In-
termediate scrutiny will not let the FBI read through American 
citizens’ personal e-mails to friends and colleagues,260 but it 
will better allow the FBI to perform its crucial antiterrorism 
activities more effectively by ensuring secrecy. 
Thus, NSL disclosures have some worth, but not value on 
par with other notable information leaks that scholars argue 
merit the highest First Amendment protection. While speech 
about government activities may lie at the heart of the First 
Amendment’s protection, the need to keep NSLs secret is more 
compelling in this case. 
C. JUDGING NSL REQUESTS UNDER A LOWER STANDARD 
This Section has suggested that intermediate scrutiny is 
appropriate for NSL review, and Doe III already has illustrated 
how strict scrutiny application would invalidate at least some 
NSL provisions. Per intermediate scrutiny review, a statute 
“will be sustained under the First Amendment if it advances 
important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression 
of free speech and does not burden substantially more speech 
than necessary to further those interests.”261 This Section ana-
lyzes competing interests to determine how reviewing courts 
should balance the competing values in an NSL dispute. 
National security is an “important government interest,” 
but is secrecy? Professor Nathan Alexander Sales has outlined 
the government’s specific interests in secrecy.262 First, secrecy 
protects the executive’s sources as well as the process by which 
the government acquires information.263 In this area, secrecy 
protects identities of covert operatives.264 Compromising those 
sources and methods may produce “devastating conse-
 
 260. See RONALD J. SIEVERT, DEFENSE, LIBERTY, AND THE CONSTITUTION: 
EXPLORING THE CRITICAL NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES OF OUR TIME 81 (2005) 
(noting that claims that the Patriot Act allows the government to read through 
e-mails without a warrant are “inaccurate and misleading”). 
 261. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997). But see Mi-
chael Stokes Paulsen, Medium Rare Scrutiny, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 397, 397–
98 (1998) (arguing that the various levels of scrutiny are defined imprecisely 
and applied inconsistently, and noting at least four different kinds of “inter-
mediate scrutiny”). The government advocates the Turner Broadcasting defi-
nition of intermediate scrutiny in its Doe I brief. 
 262. See Sales, supra note 30, at 818. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. 
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quences.”265 Second, secrecy prevents “diplomatic embarrass-
ment”—the strained relationship that results when one country 
learns that another has spied on it.266 Diplomatic embarrass-
ment also results when an entity is exposed for cooperating 
with the U.S.267 Third, and perhaps the most compelling inter-
est, secrecy preserves ongoing investigations.268 If a target 
learns he is being watched, he may destroy evidence or alert 
others in ways that jeopardize the investigation and prosecu-
tion.269 He may fabricate evidence “to throw investigators off 
his trail.”270 Even Congress has acknowledged the compelling 
need for secrecy, and it recognized as much when it passed the 
§ 2709 nondisclosure provision.271 
These interests, of course, must be balanced against the In-
ternet provider’s interests in disclosure.272 Professor Sales ar-
gues that the strength of an Internet provider’s speech interest 
hinges on the information’s origin.273 As Justice Scalia noted in 
Butterworth,274 a provider has a stronger interest in speech 
about information he possessed prior to any interaction with 
the government.275 The provider’s interests are weaker, howev-
er, when the provider wishes to disclose information obtained 
only through contact with the FBI.276 In the Doe cases, the in-
formation that Internet providers wish to reveal falls into this 
second category because, but for the NSL request, the provider 
would not know of the FBI’s actions. This suggests a reduced 
speech interest, according to Professor Sales.277 
 
 265. Id. at 820. 
 266. Id. (“America suffered severe embarrassment, and a summit between 
Khrushchev and Eisenhower was ruined, after a Soviet surface to air missile 
downed [a U.S.] spyplane over Sverdlovsk in 1960.”). 
 267. See id. 
 268. See id. (“If a target discovers he is under surveillance, he might flee or 
go into hiding.”). 
 269. See id. 
 270. Id. 
 271. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1383, at 228 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 9273, 9359 (“[The nondisclosure provision] assure[s] the absolute 
secrecy needed for the investigations covered by the exemptions.”). 
 272. See Sales, supra note 30, at 827 (“Secrecy requirements profoundly 
affect the speech interests of third parties who wish to publicly discuss their 
experiences.”). 
 273. See id. at 828. 
 274. See supra notes 134–36 and accompanying text. 
 275. See Sales, supra note 30, at 828. 
 276. See id. at 828–29. 
 277. See id. 
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Of course, the broader public may also have an interest in 
disclosure.278 One part of that interest is government accounta-
bility; the FBI may act differently if it knows that its actions 
are open to public scrutiny.279 On the other hand, secrecy can 
also serve the larger public interest—if, for example, the gov-
ernment suppresses information that could endanger American 
lives if revealed.280 
Despite these objections to nondisclosure, the above go-
vernmental interests constitute an important interest unre-
lated to the suppression of free speech. The next question, then, 
is whether the nondisclosure order substantially burdens more 
speech than necessary to further those interests. NSL nondis-
closure orders impose almost a complete ban on speech—
almost, because, as the Internet company president has shown, 
an NSL recipient still has the ability to speak anonymously 
about receiving the NSL. The recipient cannot identify himself, 
however, and for good reason: even publicly identifying himself 
as an NSL recipient could alert his customers—who may be 
FBI targets—that they are being watched. This burden on 
speech is exactly what is necessary to preserve the investigative 
value of NSLs. In any case, courts are not in a good position to 
judge what level of speech burden is appropriate in NSL cases, 
and therefore they must give substantial deference to executive 
determinations.281 In this case, the FBI has determined via cer-
tification that secrecy is necessary,282 and the current nondis-
 
 278. See id. at 816 (“‘Democracies die behind closed doors,’ and ‘[s]unlight 
is said to be the best of disinfectants.’” (citations omitted)). 
 279. See id. at 829–30 (“Government officials are less likely to misbehave if 
they know their actions are a matter of public record.”). 
 280. Id. at 830. 
 281. Compare CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 178 (1985) (“Thus, ‘[w]hat may 
seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great moment to one who has a 
broad view of the scene and may put the questioned item of information in its 
proper context.’” (quoting Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 1978))), 
and Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 927 (D.C. 
Cir. 2003) (“Given this weight of authority counseling deference in national 
security matters, we owe deference to the government's judgments contained 
in its affidavits.”), and King v. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 830 F.2d 210, 217 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987) (“[T]he court owes substantial weight to detailed agency explana-
tions in the national security context.”), with Robert P. Deyling, Judicial Defe-
rence and De Novo Review in Litigation Over National Security Information 
Under the Freedom of Information Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 67, 90 (1992) (“Judges 
dealing with these cases face a dilemma. Despite judicial deference to agency 
judgments, judges must continue to review [secrecy] cases and try to make 
that review thorough and meaningful.”). 
 282. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2709(b) (West 2000 & Supp. 2008). The proposed 
Senate bill requires the same certification. See NSL Reform Act of 2007, S. 
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closure requirement bans only the speech necessary to advance 
the government’s interest. 
Critics might suggest that the government’s interest in 
secrecy appears too vague or undefined in the NSL context. 
However, such imprecision is inevitable because intelligence 
operations are by nature shrouded in secrecy.283 Under the in-
termediate scrutiny standard, the government can show a suf-
ficiently strong interest supporting NSL nondisclosure, as well 
as appropriate tailoring given the needs of secrecy. This out-
come is different from that reached in Doe III and better re-
flects the importance of protecting key investigative techniques. 
CONCLUSION 
The company president of The Washington Post editorial 
has been successful so far, both in Doe I and III. His first chal-
lenge brought about a change in NSL policy codified in the 
Reauthorization Act. The second challenge has produced a new 
bill in the Senate. To be sure, the Doe courts noted several con-
stitutional defects in the NSL regime; it is possible that even 
under intermediate scrutiny, various NSL statutes would fail. 
For example, NSL recipients must have easy access to speedy 
judicial review, which the post-Patriot Act NSL statutes did not 
provide. Such statutes were rightly declared unconstitutional. 
Indeed, this Note has readily adopted the position that judicial 
review is necessary,284 and asked how the review should occur 
when a dispute arises. Courts should give great deference to 
executive decisions, particularly in cases in which the executive 
has determined that secrecy is necessary. This Note also argues 
that strict scrutiny is inappropriate, and that this remains true 
regardless of whether Congress passes Senate Bill 2088. 
The need for nondisclosure and preserving secrecy should 
not be understated. U.S. history presents countless examples of 
 
2088, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 283. The U.S. Supreme Court noted as much in United States v. United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. See 407 U.S. 297, 
322 (1972) (“Often, too, the emphasis of domestic intelligence gathering is on 
the prevention of unlawful activity or the enhancement of the Government's 
preparedness for some possible future crisis or emergency. Thus, the focus of 
domestic surveillance may be less precise than that directed against more con-
ventional types of crime.”). 
 284. This is justified because the latest Senate bill provides for prompt 
judicial review. See NSL Reform Act of 2007, S. 2088, 110th Cong. (2007); see 
also Deyling, supra note 281, at 90 (“[I]f courts cannot have full latitude to 
conduct that review, then no one can.”). 
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secrecy breaches and the disasters that followed. In 1942, for 
example, the Chicago Tribune reported that American forces 
had cracked a key Japanese naval code that had contributed to 
victory in the Battle of Midway.285 The newspaper’s disclosure 
prompted the Japanese to switch to a new, unbroken code.286 
The double agent Aldrich Ames’s disclosures to the U.S.S.R. re-
sulted in the executions of at least ten American agents.287 
Even more troubling is a case involving the hunt for Osama bin 
Laden. After the 1998 U.S. missile strikes on Afghanistan, “a 
newspaper revealed that American investigators were aware 
that al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden used a satellite tele-
phone to communicate with his associates. . . .”288 After the 
newspaper report, “bin Laden abruptly stopped using the phone 
and investigators lost the ability to eavesdrop on his conversa-
tions.”289 
The list of harms goes on, and the takeaway should be ap-
parent: secrecy is highly valuable, and the Executive, as nu-
merous courts have acknowledged, is in the best position to de-
termine when secrecy is appropriate. In reviewing NSL 
statutes, intermediate scrutiny appropriately balances national 
interests against individual rights. Since “the energy of the Ex-
ecutive is the bulwark of the national security,”290 courts should 
defer accordingly. 
 
 285. Sales, supra note 30, at 818–19. 
 286. Id. at 819. 
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ter ed., 1961. 
